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Existence of Open Loop Equilibria
for Disturbed Stackelberg Games
T.-P. Azevedo Perdicoúlis, G. Jank and P. Lopes dos Santos
Abstract
In this work, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of
an hierarchic equilibrium of a disturbed two player linear quadratic game with open
loop information structure. A convexity condition guarantees the existence of a
unique Stackelberg equilibria; this solution is first obtained in terms of a pair of
symmetric Riccati equations and also in terms of a coupled of system of Riccati
equations. In this latter case, the obtained equilibrium controls are of feedback type.
Keywords: differential games, linear quadratic, Riccati differential equations,
Stackelberg equilibrium, worst-case disturbance
1. Introduction
The study of linear quadratic (LQ) games has been addressed by many authors
[1–4]. This type of games is often used as a benchmark to assess the game equilib-
rium strategies and its respective outcomes. In a disturbed differential game, each
player calculates its strategy taking into account a worst-case unknown disturbance.
In non-cooperative game theory, the concept of hierarchical or Stackelberg games is
very important, since different applications in economics and engineering exist
[1, 5]. This is also the case of gas networks where a hierarchy may be assigned to its
controllable elements—compressors, sources, reductors, etc… Also, for this appli-
cation, the modelling as a disturbed game makes a lot of sense, since the unknown
offtakes of the network can be modelled as unknown disturbances. Further research
on Stackelberg games can be found for instance in AbouKandil and Bertrand [6];
Medanic [7]; Yong [8]; Tolwinski [9].
No assumptions/constraints are made of the disturbance. To be easier to under-
stand the hierarchical concept, we consider only two players. Therefore, we study a
LQ game of two players with Open Loop (OL) information structure where the
players choose its strategy according to a modified Stackelberg equilibrium. Player-
1 is the follower and chooses its strategy after the nomination of the strategy of the
leader. Player-2, the leader, chooses its strategy assuming rationality of the follower.
Both players find their strategies assuming a worst-case disturbance.
In this work, we consider a finite time horizon, where for applications this is
chosen according to the periodicity of the operation of the problem being studied.
The disturbed case of the representation of optimal equilibria for noncoopera-
tive games has been studied [10, 11] considering a Nash equilibrium. It is the aim of
this paper to generalise the work of Jank and Kun to Stackelberg games and extend
the results presented in Freiling and Jank [12]; Freiling et al. [13] to the disturbed
1
case. To calculate the controls, we use a value function approach, appropriately
guessed. Thence, we obtain sufficient conditions of existence of these controls and
its representation in terms of the solution of certain Riccati equations. Furthermore,
a feedback form of the worst-case Stackelberg equilibrium is obtained.
In a future paper, we expect to present analogous conditions using an operator
approach.
In Section 2, we define the disturbed LQ game and define Stackelberg worst-case
equilibrium. In Section 3, we derive sufficient conditions for the existence of a
worst-case Stackelberg equilibrium under OL information structure and investigate
how are these solutions related to certain Riccati differential equations. Section 4
concludes the paper and outlines some directions for future work.
2. Fundamental notions
We start with the concept of best reply:
Definition 2.1. (Best reply) Let ΓN be a N-player differential game. For
i∈ 1, … ,Nf g,
γ ið Þ≔ γ1, … , γi1, γiþ1, … , γN
 
∈ ⊗ j 6¼iU j:
We say that ~γi is the best reply against γ ið Þ if
Ji γ1, … , γi1,~γi, γiþ1, … , γN
 
≤ Ji γ1, … , γNð Þ
holds for any strategy γi ∈U i. We denote the set of all best replies by Ri γ ið Þ
 
.
We study games of quadratic criteria, defined in a finite time horizon t0, t f
 
⊂
and subject to a linear dynamics, controlled players and also an unknown distur-
bance. Hereby also consider u j ¼ γ j t, η j
 
, where η j is the information structure of
Player-j. In this case, η j, j ¼ 1, … ,N, is of OL type.
Definition 2.2. (Linear Quadratic (LQ) differential game) Let ΓN be an N
player differential game finite time horizon T ¼ t0, t f
 
: Suppose further that:
i. the dynamics of the game are assumed to obey a linear differential equation
_x tð Þ ¼ A tð Þx tð Þ þ
XN
j¼1
B j tð Þu j tð Þ þ C tð Þw tð Þ,
x t0ð Þ ¼ x0:
(1)
In this equation, t∈ T , where the initial t0 and the final t f are finite and fixed,
the state x tð Þ is an n dimension vector of continuous functions defined in T and
with x t f
 
¼ x f . The controls ui, i ¼ 1, … ,N, are square (Lebesgue) integrable and
the mi dimension vector of continuous functions is also defined in T . Also, the
disturbance w tð Þ∈Lm Tð Þ: The different matrices are of adequate dimension and
with elements continuous in T .
i. the performance criteria are of the form
Ji ui, u ið Þ,w
 
¼ K x t f
  
þ
ðt f
t0
Ψ ui, u ið Þ,w
 
dt: (2)
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where
K x t f
  
¼ xT t f
 
Kifx t f
 
(3)
Ψ ui, u ið Þ,w
 
¼ xT tð ÞQ i tð Þx tð Þ þ w
T tð ÞPi tð Þw tð Þ
þ
XN
j¼1
uTj tð ÞRij tð Þu j tð Þ,
(4)
with symmetric matrices Kif ∈
nn and symmetric, piecewise continuous and
bounded matrix valued functions Q i tð Þ∈
nn, Rij tð Þ∈
mim j and Pi tð Þ∈
mm,
i ¼ 1, 2, … ,N:
We observe that no cost functional is assigned to the disturbance term because
no constraints can be applied on an “unpredictable” parameter. In what follows, we
consider N ¼ 2: To extend the theory to N > 2, since this is an hierarchical solution,
we need to define the structure of the leaders and followers in the game. We can
even have more than two hierachy levels. We assume that Player-2 is the leader and
Player-1 is the follower.
The leader seeks a strategy u ∗2 tð Þ in OL information structure and announces it
before the game starts. This strategy is found knowing how the follower reacts to his
choices. The follower calculates its strategy as a best reply to the strategy announced
by the leader.
Problem 2.1. Find the control u ∗i ∈U i, i ¼ 1, 2, in T for which
J ∗i ui, u
∗
ið Þ,w
 
, i ¼ 1, 2, is minimal when subject to constraints u ∗i tð Þ ¼
γ
∗
i t, ηi tð Þð Þ, i ¼ 1, 2, and (1) and considering a worst-case disturbance.
Consider U i, i ¼ 1, 2, the sets of functions such that (1) is solvable and Ji exists,
with ui, i ¼ 1, 2, in these conditions U i, i ¼ 1, 2,W are said the sets of admissible
controls and disturbance, respectively.
Definition 2.3. (Stackelberg equilibrium) Let Γ2 be a 2-person differential game,
we define the Stackelberg/worst-case equilibrium in two stages.
1.A function w^i uð Þ∈W is called the worst-case disturbance, from the point of
view of the ith player belonging to the set of admissible controls, if
J ∗i ui, u
∗
ið Þ, w^i
 
≥ J ∗i ui, u
∗
ið Þ,w
 
, i ¼ 1, 2, (5)
holds for each w∈W. There exists exactly one worst-case disturbance from
the point of view of the ith player according to every set of controls.
2.We say that the controls u ∗1 , u
∗
2
 
form a worst-case Stackelberg equilibrium if
i. The leader chooses u ∗2 such that
max
γ1 ∈R1 u
∗
2ð Þ
J2 γ1, u
∗
2 , w^2
 
≤ max
γ1 ∈R1 u2ð Þ
J2 γ1, u2, w^2ð Þ
for all u2 ∈U2:
ii. The follower then chooses u ∗1 such that
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R1 u2ð Þ ¼ u1jJ1 u1, u2, w^1ð Þ≤ J1 γ1, u2, w^1ð Þf g:
To guarantee the uniqueness of OL Stackelberg solutions, matrices are assumed
to satisfy Kif ≥ 0,Q i ≥ 0,Rij >0, i 6¼ j and Rii ≥ 0, i, j ¼ 1, … ,N in T Simaan and
Cruz [14].
In what follows, we drop the dependence of the parameters in t to reduce the
length of the formulas.
3. Sufficient conditions for the existence of OL Stackelberg equilibria
In this section, we withdraw sufficient conditions for the existence of the worst-
case Stackelberg equilibrium, using a value function approach.
A disturbed differential LQ game as defined in Definition 2.2 is said playable if
there exists a unique Stackelberg worst-case equilibrium.
Theorem 3.1. Let the solution of the Riccati differential equation
_E1 ¼ E1A A
TE1  Q1 þ E1 S1 þ T1ð ÞE1,
E1 t f
 
¼ K1f ,
(6)
with S1 ¼ B1R
1
11 B
T
1 and T1 ¼ CP
1
1 C
T exist on T .
For any given admissible OL control of the leader, u2, define e1 ∈
n, d1 ∈ by
_e1 ¼ E1 S1 þ T1ð Þe1  2E1B2u2  A
TeT1 ,
e1 t f
 
¼ 0
(7)
_d1 ¼  u
T
2 R12 þ e
T
1 B2
 
u2 þ
1
4
eT1 S1 þ T1ð Þe1,
d1 t f
 
¼ 0:
(8)
Then, the following identity holds:
2J1 u1, u2ð Þ ¼ x
T
0E1 t0ð Þx0 þ x
T
0e1 t0ð Þ þ d1 t0ð Þ
þ
ðt f
t0
∥z1 tð Þ∥
2
R11
dtþ
ðt f
t0
∥z tð Þ∥2P1dt,
(9)
where ∥z1∥
2
R11
¼ z1R11z1 with
z1 ¼ u1 þ R
1
11 B
T
1 E1xþ
1
2
e1
 	
and ∥z∥2P1 ¼ zP1z with
z ¼ wþ P11 C
T E1xþ
1
2
e1
 	
and x a solution of (1).
Proof: The proof is similar to the analogous result for the non-disturbed case
Freiling et al. [13].
Theorem 3.2. Let the solution E1 of (6) exist on T . Then the unique response of
the follower to the leader’s OL strategy u2 tð Þ is given by:
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u ∗1 ¼ R
1
11 B
T
1 E1xþ
1
2
e1
 	
, (10)
where the maximum disturbance,
w ∗1 ¼ P
1
1 C
T E1xþ
1
2
e1
 	
, (11)
was considered. E1 and e1 are the solutions of (6)–(7) and x is then the
solution of
_x ¼ A S1 þ T1ð ÞE1½ x
1
2
S1 þ T1ð Þe1 þ B2u2, (12)
x t0ð Þ ¼ x0: (13)
The corresponding minimal costs then are
J10 ¼ 2J1 u1, u2ð Þ ¼ x
T
0E1 t0ð Þx0 þ x
T
0e1 t0ð Þ þ d1 t0ð Þ: (14)
Proof:We have that the unique OL response of the follower to the leader’s
announced strategy u2 (10) under worst-case disturbance (11), that we substitute in
the trajectory (1) to obtain:
_x ¼ A S1 þ T1ð ÞE1½ x
1
2
S1 þ T1ð Þe1 þ B2u2:
The cost functional minimal value is obtained when we substitute in (9) the
minimal control and themaximal disturbance.
Notice that J10 u2ð Þ is not depending on u1: This, as a matter of fact, is only true if
we consider OL information structure, since otherwise u2 would depend on the
trajectory x and hence, via (1), also on u1: In OL Stackelberg games, the leader tries
next to find an optimal OL control u2 that minimises J2 u1 u2ð Þ, u2ð Þ while u1 u2ð Þ is
defined by (10).
Theorem 3.3. Let the solution of the Riccati differential Eq. (6) and the
solution of
_E2 ¼ E2H H
TE2  Q þ E2 Sþ Tð ÞE2,
E2 t f
 
¼
K2f 0
0 0
0
@
1
A, (15)
with S21≔B1R
1
11 R21R
1
11 B
T
1 , S2≔B2R
1
22 B
T
2 and T2≔CP
1
2 C
T
: Also
H≔
A S1
Q1 E1T1  A
T
 	
, Q ≔
Q2 0
0 S21
 	
, S≔
S2 0
0 0
 	
and
T≔
T2 T2E1
E1T2 E1T2E1
 	
exist in T , where E2 ∈
2n2n
: Also B ≔
B2
0m1n
 	
:
For any given control u2 of the leader, define functions e2 ∈
3n, v1, vw, x∈
n
and d2 ∈ in T by the following initial and terminal value problems:
_e2 ¼ H
T þ E2 Sþ Tð Þ
 
e2, e2 t f
 
¼ 0 (16)
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_d2 ¼
1
4
eT2 Sþ Tð Þe2, d2 t f
 
¼ 0 (17)
_v1 ¼ Q1xþ E1T1  A
T
 
v1 þ E1Cw,
v1 t0ð Þ ¼ v10
(18)
_x ¼ Ax S1v1 þ B2u2 þ Cw, x t0ð Þ ¼ x0, (19)
with v1≔ E1 þ 12 e1
 
:
Then, we obtain
u ∗1 ¼ R
1
11 B
T
1 v1,
w ∗1 ¼ P
1
1 C
Tv1,
and the following identity
2J2 u
∗
1 ; u
∗
2 ;w
∗
2
 
¼ xT0 v10
 
E2 t0ð Þ
x0
v10
 !
þ xT0 v10
 
e2 t0ð Þ þ d2 t0ð Þ
þ
Ð tf
t0
∥z2∥
2
R22
dtþ
Ð tf
t0
∥z∥2P2dt,
where y ¼
x
v1
 	
, ∥z2∥
2
R22
¼ z2R22z2 and
z2 ¼ u2 þ R122 B
T
2 0m1n
 
E2yþ
1
2
e2
 	
and 0min, i ¼ 1, 2 the mi  n dimensional zero matrix and ∥z∥
2
P2
¼ zP2z and
z ¼ w2 þ P
1
2 C
T
1 E2yþ
1
2
e2
 	
:
Proof: Consider (10): u ∗1 ¼ R
1
11 B
T
1 E1xþ
1
2
e1
 	
|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
≔ v1
: Then, differentiate v1 and
substitute the derivatives into the obtained expression using (6), (7) and (8). Also,
the optimal control u ∗1 and disturbance w
∗
1 in (11). Hence:
_v1 ¼ Q1x A
Tv1,
_x ¼ Ax S1v1 þ B2u2 þ Cw:
Hence defining H≔
A S1
Q1 E1T1  A
T
 	
, B≔
B2
Onm2
 	
and C1≔
I
E1
 	
C: We
define y≔
x
v1
 	
to write these two equations as: (??) as:
_y ¼ Hyþ Bu2 þ C1w (20)
Next, we consider the following value function
~V2 tð Þ ¼ V2 t, y tð Þð Þ ¼ y
TE2yþ e
T
2 yþ d2 (21)
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for some mappings E2 : T ! 
2n2n, e2 : T ! 
2n, and d2 : T ! 
2, where E2 is
symmetric for each t∈T:
We consider (21), where we substitute (20):
d~V2
dt
¼
d
dt
yTE2yþ e
T
2 yþ d2
 
¼ _yTE2yþ y
T _E2yþ y
TE2 _yþ _e
T
2 yþ e
T
2 _yþ
_d2
þxTQ2xþ u
T
1 R21u1 þ u
T
2 R22u2 þ w
TP2w ψ2
¼ yTHT þ uT2 B
TwTCT1
 
E2y
þyT _E2yþ y
TE2 Hyþ Bu2 þ C1wð Þ
þ_eT2 yþ e
T
2 Hyþ Bu2 þ C1wð Þ þ
_d2
þyT
Q2 0
0 S21
 !
|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
≔Q
yþ uT2 R22u2 þ w
TP2w ψ2
Now we associate certain terms
¼ yT HTE2 þ _E2 þ E2H þQ
 
y
þ u2  y2
 T
R22 u2  y2
 
þyT2 R22u2 þ u
T
2 R22y2  y
T
2 R22y2
þ w αð ÞTP2 w αð Þ
þwTP2αþ α
TP2w α
TP2α
þuT2 B
TE2yþ B
Te2
 
þ yTE2Bþ
1
2
eT2 B
 	
u2
þwT CT1 E2yþ C
T
1 e2
 
þ yTE2C1 þ
1
2
eT2C1
 	
w
_eT2 þ e
T
2H
 
yþ _d2  ψ2
and furthermore
¼ yT HTE2 þ _E2 þ E2H þQ
 
y ψ2
þ u2  y2
 T
R22 u2  y2
 
 yT2 R22y2
þ w αð ÞTP2 w αð Þ  α
TP2α
þuT2 B
TE2yþ B
T 1
2
e2 þ R22y2
 	
þ yTE2Bþ
1
2
eT2 By
T
2 R22
 	
u2
þwT CT1 E2yþ C
T
1
1
2
e2 þ P2α
 	
þ yTE2C1 þ
1
2
eT2C1  α
TP2
 	
w
_eT2 þ e
T
2H
 
yþ _d2  ψ2
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Consider
R22y2 þ B
T
2 Om2n
 
E2yþ
1
2
e2
 	
¼ 0
and also
CT1 E2yþ
1
2
e2
 	
þ P2α ¼ 0
If R22 >0 then y2 ¼ R
1
22 B
T
2 Om2n
 
E2yþ
1
2 e2
 
: If P2 >0 then
α ¼ P12 C1 E2yþ
1
2 e2
 
:
Define S≔
S2 0
0 0
 	
and T≔
T2 T2E1
E1T2 E1T2E1
 	
. Substitute this y2 and α in the
calculations:
¼ yT HTE2 þ _E2 þ E2H þQ  E2 Sþ Tð ÞE2
 
y
þ u2  y2
 T
R22 u2  y2
 
þ w αð ÞTP2 w αð Þ
þ _eT2 þ e
T
2H  E2 Sþ Tð Þ
 
y
þ _d2 
1
4
eT2 Sþ Tð Þe2  ψ2
Considering:
HTE2 þ _E2 þ E2H þ Q  E2 Sþ Tð ÞE2 ¼ 0
_eT2 þ e
T
2H  e
T
2 Sþ Tð ÞE2 ¼ 0
_d2 
1
4
eT2 Sþ Tð Þe2 ¼ 0
that is
_E2 ¼ H
TE2  E2H  Q þ E2 Sþ Tð ÞE2
_e2 ¼ H
T þ E2 Sþ Tð Þ
 
e2
_d2 ¼
1
4
eT2 Sþ Tð Þe2
We end up with
d~V2 tð Þ
dt
¼ u2  y2
 T
R22 u2  y2
 
þ w αð ÞTP2 w αð Þ  ψ2
(22)
Integrating yields:
~V2 t f
 
 ~V tð Þ ¼
ðt f
t
u2  y2
 T
R22 u2  y2
 h
þ w αð ÞTP2 w αð Þs
i
dτ 
ðt f
t
ψ2dτ:
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Further, we assume the mappings E2, e2, d2 to be chosen in such a way that the
following terminal values hold:
E2 t f
 
¼ K2 f
e2 t f
 
¼ 0
d2 t f
 
¼ 0
Then, we obtain ~V2 t f
 
¼ yT t f
 
Ky f y t f
 
and substituting:
~V2 tð Þ ¼ y
T t f
 
Ky f y t f
 

ðt f
t
u2  y2
 T
R22 u2  y2
 h
þ w αð ÞTP2 w αð Þ
i
dτ þ
ðt f
t
ψ2dτ
(23)
Observe that the rhs of (23) does not depend of uj t0,t½  and the rls of (23) does not
depend of u2j t,t f½ : Then considering now the infimal value, we recall that:
V2 t, yð Þ ¼ inf
u2j
t,t f½ 
ðt f
t
ψ2 τ, y^ τð Þ, u τð Þð Þdτ þ y
T t f
 
K2 f y t f
 
Now, we substitute this into (23) and consider the infimal values over all possi-
ble control functions in t, t f
 
:
~V2 tð Þ ¼ inf y
T t f
 
K2 f y t f
 
þ
ðt f
t
ψ2dτ|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
V2 t, yð Þ
 inf
ðt f
t
u2  y2
 T
R22 u2  y2
 h
þ w αð ÞTP2 w αð Þ
i
dτ
then we have:
V2 t, yð Þ ¼ ~V tð Þ þ inf
ujt,t f
ðt f
t
u2  y2
 T
R22 u2  y2
 h
þ w αð ÞTP2 w αð Þ
i
dτ
V2 t, yð Þ equals ~V2 tð Þ if u2  y2  0∀t∈ T and w α ¼ 0: As the leader chooses
his strategy assuming rationality of the follower and worst-case disturbance, the
follower should take also the worst-case disturbance into account.
To conclude, consider t ¼ t0 and hence:
V2 t0, yð Þ ¼ ~V2 t0ð Þ þ inf
ujt0,t f
ðt f
t0
u2  y2
 T
R22 u2  y2
 h
þ w αð ÞTP2 w αð Þ
i
dτ
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Then from (21):
V2 t0, yð Þ ¼ y
T
0E2 t0ð Þy0 þ e
T
2 t0ð Þy0 þ d2 t0ð Þ
þ inf
ujt0,t f
ðt f
t0
u2  y2
 T
R22 u2  y2
 h
þ w αð ÞTP2 w αð Þ
i
dτ
Defining z2≔ u2  y2 ¼ u2 þ R
1
22 B
T
2 0
 
E2yþ
1
2 e2
 
and z≔w α ¼
wþ P12 C1 E2yþ
1
2 e2
 
, we have:
V2 t0, yð Þ ¼ y
T
0E2 t0ð Þy0 þ e
T
2 t0ð Þy0 þ d2 t0ð Þ
þ
ðt f
t0
z2k k
2
R22
þ zk k2P2dt
Now, we substitute y0 ¼
x0
v10
 	
:
The leader may choose its best answer either by accounting directly for its
worst-case disturbance or by considering that the follower knows that there is a
worst-case disturbance. In this work, the leader takes the worst-case disturbance
directly into account.
Notice that in the term
J20 ¼ x
T
0 v10
 
E2 t0ð Þ
x0
v10
 	
, (24)
x0,E2 t0ð Þ, do not depend on the choice of u1, u2: Since we shall study the
situation for Player-2 when Player-1 applies his optimal response control defined in
(10), we have to set v1 ¼ E1xþ 12 e1: From (7), we can see that v1 t0ð Þ ¼ v10 depends
on e1 t0ð Þ and hence also on u2:
In order to derive from Theorems (3.1) and (3.3) sufficient conditions for the
existence of a unique worst-case Stackelberg equilibrium, we must get rid of the u2-
dependence on v10: Therefore, we propose to restrict the set of admissible controls
to functions representable in linear feedback form. This is what we do next.
Theorem 3.4. Let the solutions E1 tð Þ∈
nn,E2 ∈
2n2n of (6) and (15) exist in
T , respectively. Let further the coupled system of equations
_K1 ¼ Q1  K1A A
TK1 þ K1 S1 þ T1ð ÞK1
þK1S2K2,
(25)
_K2 ¼ Q2  K2A A
TK2 þQ1pþ K2S1K1
þK2 S2 þ T2ð ÞK2 þ K2T2E1p,
(26)
_p ¼ pA S21K1 þ S1K2 þ A T1E1ð Þp
þpS1K1 þ p S2 þ T2ð ÞK2 þ pT2E1p,
(27)
admits a solution in T .
Then, there exists a unique open loop disturbed Stackelberg equilibrium in
feedback synthesis which is given by
u ∗1 tð Þ ¼ R
1
11 tð ÞB
T
1 tð ÞK1 tð Þx tð Þ, (28)
u ∗2 tð Þ ¼ R
1
22 tð ÞB
T
2 tð ÞK2 tð Þx tð Þ, (29)
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considering worst-case disturbamces w ∗i and where x tð Þ is a solution of the
closed loop equation
_x ¼ A S1K1  S2 þ T2ð ÞK2  T2E1p½ x,
x t0ð Þ ¼ x0:
(30)
The minimal cost for the follower, J10 u
∗
2
 
, is as in (14), and for the leader is
J20 u
∗
1 , u
∗
2
 
¼
1
2
xT0 In,K
T
1 t0ð Þ
 
E2 t0ð Þ t0ð Þ
In
K1 t0ð Þ
 !
x0
"
þ eT2 t0ð Þ
In
K1 t0ð Þ
 !
x0 þ d2 t0ð Þ
#
where e2 t0ð Þ, d2 t0ð Þ are determined by (16) and (17), respectively.
Proof: The proof is similar to the analogous result for the non-disturbed case [13].
From the convexity assumptions, it follows that S1, S,Q1,Q and E1 t f
 
,E2 t f
 
are all semidefinite. Therefore, as far as the convexity conditions hold, the standard
Riccati matrix Eqs. (6) and (15) are globally solvable in ∞, t f
 
[15].
It still remains the following questions to be answered (i) direct criteria for
solvability of these equations if the convexity assumption is guaranteed as well as
(ii) solvability of the coupled system of Eqs. (25)–(27).
Actually, this system of equations can also be written as a single, nonsymmetric
Riccati matrix differential equation. Hence:
_K1
_K2
_p
0
BB@
1
CCA ¼
Q1
Q2
0
0
BB@
1
CCA
K1
K2
p
0
BB@
1
CCAA
þ
AT 0 0
0 AT Q1
S21 S1 A T1E1
0
BB@
1
CCA
K1
K2
p
0
BB@
1
CCA
þ
K1
K2
p
0
BB@
1
CCA S1 þ T1, S2, 0ð Þ
K1
K2
p
0
BB@
1
CCA
K1
K2
p
0
BB@
1
CCA t f  ¼
K1f
K2f
0
0
BB@
1
CCA:
(31)
As it can be easily observed, all these Riccati equations are of nonsymmetric
type:
_W ¼ B21 WB11 þ B22W þWB12W,
W t f
 
¼W f ,
(32)
whereW is a matrix of order k n whose coefficients are of adequate size. See
AbouKandil et al. [16] for results on the existence of solution of Riccati equations.
11
Existence of Open Loop Equilibria for Disturbed Stackelberg Games
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.92202
4. Discussion and conclusions
High dimension problems appeal to the use of hierarchic and decentralised
models as differential games. One example of these problems is large networks, as
for instance the management and control of high pressure gas networks. Since this
is a large dimension and geographically dispersed problem, a decentralised formu-
lation captures the non-cooperative nature, and sometimes even antagonistic, of the
different stake-holders in the network.
The network controllable elements can be seen as players that seek their best
settings and then interact among themselves to check for network feasibility. The
equilibrium sought by the players depends on the way the players are organised
among themselves. It makes some sense to have some autonomous elements that
run the network and others follow, as is the case of a main inlet point of a country,
as it happens with the inlet of Sines in the portuguese network. The ultimate goal of
the network is to meet customers’ demand at the lowest cost. As the main variation
of the problem is due to the off-takes, these may be seen as perturbations to
nominal consumption levels of a deterministic model.
Therefore, it makes some sense to view the gas transportation and distribution
system as a disturbed Stackelberg game where the players play against a worst-
case disturbance, that means a sudden change in weather conditions from one
period of operation to the other. Neverthless, the theory is not ready, and also
having in mind the development of algorithms, direct solution methods, and
explicit solution representations need to be further investigated. In this work, we
have obtained sufficient conditions for the existence of the solution of a 2-player
game. However, direct criteria for solvability of this problem needs more work.
Also, the solvability of the coupled system of Eqs. (25)–(27) has to be further
investigated. Also, we would like to solve the same problem using an operator
approach.
Similarly to what we have done in the past for Nash games, we would like to
study this problem considering the underlying dynamics as a repetitive process,
that seems to be adequate to capture the behaviour seemingly periodic of the
network. Also, the boundary control of the network depends on the type of
strategy sought by the players. The structure of these versions of the problems
need to be examined.
The obtained results, in every stage of the work, should be applied to a single
pipe and ideally using some operational data. Furthermore, we expect to apply the
work to a simple network, which is not exactly a straightforward extension.
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